

Christianity and its legacy in education

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Much of the discussion regarding religion and schooling in the US has been limited to ideological clashes surrounding the role of the courts and, ostensibly, the much litigated issue of prayer in schools. This comes at the expense of an examination of deeper curricular issues rooted in language and school mechanisms borne of historical consequences. The authors seek to reframe the discussion of religion and schooling, arguing that to suggest that the removal of explicit prayerfulness equates to the cleansing of US public education of its religious character is facile and ahistorical. They suggest, instead, that religion remains in the language, practices, and routines of schooling but also in conceptions of the “child” and assumptions about the role of schools emanating from such conceptions. Evoking the notion of *pentimento*, the piece seeks to elucidate the Judeo-Christian character of schooling in the US as a way of re-imagining discussions regarding the relationship between religion and/as curriculum. The piece concludes with a discussion of the implications of such an examination for curriculum studies and teacher education.

Keywords: curriculum theory; cultural studies; role of religion; state church separation; teacher education

Introduction

We Americans are ... taught to think of American society as a secular one in which religion does not count for much, and our educational system is organized in such a way that religious concerns often receive little attention. But if you think for a moment, you may realize that a better question is, where does religion *not* come into all this? You will not get very far into any educational issues without somehow bumping into religious themes. (Marty 2000: 23).

It may seem, following the various court decisions separating church and state and, more specifically, religion and education, that the relationship between religion and education has long been settled and that religion is indeed absent from the halls of public education and its discourses. In this article, we attempt to challenge this assumption, suggesting that while *de-jure* religion is indeed separated from education, it is very much

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embedded, de-facto, in current, public educational practices and discourses. We intend to illustrate that, despite the fact that religion is not taught in schools—that is, one might teach *about* religion in some classes (e.g. social studies) but students are not directly taught to follow a particular religion—religious understandings, in content and pedagogy, still underlie much of what is done in the name of public education in the US.

This, of course, should come as no surprise. For while court decisions have ruled that teaching religion in schools is not permissible, it is difficult—perhaps impossible—to separate religion from schooling. After all, European schools, which have served as the forbearers of American education, originated, during the Middle Ages, within and by the church and, as divinity (divine?) schools, were designed for the purpose of studying the teachings of religion. While such a vision, enhanced in the US by early European-American settlers' perceptions of the role of education as serving primarily religious purposes, has been largely abandoned in modern America, traces of its legacy may be harder to abandon, especially in a nation where a majority of citizens still declare themselves Christian, if not through a religious identification then as a cultural one.¹

While the historical roots and ties of American education to Christianity are well documented (we delve into that area in more detail in the next section of the paper), its contemporary manifestations have, by and large, been absent from the educational literature. By this we do not mean that religion and education have not been a topic of scholarly debate. Quite the opposite. A large body of literature has long existed on character/moral/virtue education, much of which discusses (in some cases, advocates a return to) the religious—read Christian—roots of such education (e.g. Lynn 1964, Purpel 1989, Jackson *et al.* 1993, Nash 1997, Palmer 1998, Hunter 2000; Marty 2000; Bennett 2001, Damon 2002, Kunzman 2006, Warren and Patrick 2006). A small, but growing, number of studies in both religious and public schools have examined individual teachers' religious beliefs and their impact on those teachers' sense of educational mission/purpose and on curriculum and instruction in their classrooms (e.g. Peshkin 1986, Schweber 2006, Hartwick 2009, White 2009). Another substantive literature, originating from the political right, advocates the re-insertion of religion into public education (e.g. Nielson 1966; Bracher and Barr 1982; Webb 2000) or calls for enlarging the voucher system to help fund parochial schools (e.g. Miner 1999; Connell 2000). It is often difficult to extricate religion from much of the scholarly and public debate ensuing, on both sides of the political divide, regarding school teaching of 'hot button' issues such as abortion, creationism, sexual education, censorship of school library books, and the treatment of gay/lesbian issues and students.

As substantive and informative as the above bodies of literature are about the relationship between religion and education, none focus on the role of religion in the broader, daily, often implicit, practices of public education (for an exception, see Jackson *et al.* 1993), whether one teaches 'hot button' issues or not, and regardless of the specific religious beliefs of a particular classroom teacher. In other words, while these bodies of liter-

ature do point to the difficulty of separating the theological from the cultural or the personal when discussing religion and education, as well as point to the importance of schooling as an arena for the playing out of the intersection among religion, culture, identity, and education, they do not explore the role of religion in the mundanities of daily practices and discourses of schooling that structure and give meaning to that which does and does not happen in most of any public school classrooms and universities, regardless of what is taught or who teaches it.

This absence of engagement with the impact of religion in/on curricular practices in current-day education might be surprising in light of the existing scholarly engagement with the impact of other identity categories on schooling. Indeed, as much of the educational literature over the last several decades has indicated, it is difficult to speak meaningfully about education without examining the role and impact of a variety of categories of difference—e.g. gender, race, class—in how schools are organized, in what is (and is not) taught, in how things are taught and to whom, and who gets advantages/disadvantaged by those practices. Yet, while numerous scholars have already explored the role of gender in education and/or the always already gendered nature of educational practices (e.g. Noddings 1992, Mac an Ghail 1994, Martin 1994, Diller *et al.* 1996, Esptein and Johnson 1998, Sadker and Sadker 2001, Pascoe 2007) and others have done the same with regards to race (Delpit 1988, McCarthy and Crichlow 1993, Ladson-Billings 2003, Fry 2007) and class (Willis 1977, Apple 1979, 1982, 1986, Giroux 1981, Weiss 1988, 2008, Weis and Fine 1993), there has been very little critical examination of these issues as they pertain to religion. That is, how religion—in our case, Christianity as the dominant religion in the United States—pervades educational practices and the lived curriculum of schools even when religion is not a topic taught in school. Much like Whiteness prior to the mid-1990s, the impact of religion on educational practices has, by and large, been a neglected topic in educational literature,² allowing it, to borrow from Kincheloe and Steinberg (1997), to remain this ‘nothingness, this taken for granted entity’ yet, at the same time, assuming a shadow that becomes part of a ‘transcendental consciousness’ (p. 30).

It is unclear to us whether this lack of engagement with religion has to do with the mistaken assumption that following court decisions, the issue has been resolved and thus requires no further analysis, or whether it has to do with the ability of religion and its practices to present themselves as invisible in education to those working in—and writing on—the field. Regardless, and considering that if one perceives of the various categories of difference—race, gender, class, religion, to name a few—applying equally, and in conjunction, to produce a particular educational experience in schools, then one ought to believe that an examination of religion and its impact on what does and does not take place in the name of education is both necessary and timely.

Our aim here, then, and following the footsteps of critical examinations of schooling with regard to gender, race, and class, and using literature from post-structuralism (e.g. Foucault 1977) and childhood studies (e.g. Aries 1962; Jenks 1996,2001) to do so, is to highlight the relation-

ship between broader, routine educational practices and trace their possible relation to their religious—Christian—roots. We use the combination ‘possible relation’ to emphasize the fact that what we are attempting here is not to illustrate direct causality between existing educational practices and Christianity. There is little evidence to directly and conclusively support such claims and too many layers of history to obscure the direct relationship between current practices in one field (Education) and past practices in another (Religion). Rather, and invoking the metaphor of penitimento, we wish to explore instances in which educational practices and beliefs may be layered upon Christian practices and beliefs. Penitimento (from Italian *pentirsi*: ‘to repent’), refers to ‘a sign or trace of an alteration in a literary or artistic work; (*spec. in Painting*) a visible trace of a mistake or an earlier composition seen through later layers of paint on a canvas’.³ It is the reappearance or persistence of underlying Christian elements or vestiges in current conceptions (images) and practices of education that we wish here to explore.

To do so, we divide this paper into three: We begin with a brief historical analysis of schooling in the USA to expose its roots in Christian thought. We then move to examine the vestiges, or remnants, of those historical roots of Christian conceptions in current day pedagogical and curricular practices and discourses. We conclude by exploring the implications of the understandings derived from our analysis in the first two sections of the paper for education, with a particular focus on what it might mean for the preparation of teachers.

It is important to note that our intent in this paper is not necessarily alarmist—a call to expunge education of its religious roots. Rather, we believe discussions about religion and its role in societal—political, cultural, social, and, yes, educational—issues ought to play a more prominent role in conversations in and about education. By that we do not mean that schools ought to teach students to follow a particular religion but, rather, that they ought to focus more intently on teaching students about the role religion(s) have played and continue to play in both the private and public arenas. To understand why the majority of US society acts in particular ways, why certain policies are adopted and accepted as ‘reasonable’ by the public, or to examine the roots of various world conflicts, one cannot avoid exploring issues of values, morals, and ethics, many of which find their origin in religious traditions and beliefs. The same, we believe, applies to the realm of education.

In addressing *Christianity*, this account will, of necessity, intertwine both Catholic and Protestant historical strands. Although we wish to acknowledge—and honour—the differences in approaches to Christianity manifest in these often divergent traditions, it is our conceit here that, when it comes to educational practices, most particularly regarding the ordering, disciplining, saving, and shaming of the ‘fallen’ student, Catholicism and Protestantism have been very much of a piece in their curricular/pedagogical approaches (Spong 2005). In doing so, we recognize, we may gloss divergences in modes of worship and dogmatic splits in search of a shared and troubling history.

Education and its Christian roots: A (brief) history

While it may appear to those involved in 21st century US public education that, following the First Amendment and the ensuing Supreme Court decisions separating religion and education, public education and religion are antithetical to each other, the role of religion—Christianity—in the formation and history of schooling in the US is well documented. Indeed, the history of US schools as proselytizing institutions extends across oceans of time and water both.

The origins of secular educational institutions in western civilization can be traced back to the first medieval universities and the inclination of religious institutions, which, at the time, became more influential, less disconnected from local concerns, and increasingly political, to branch out from the inward view of the initial monasteries and begin looking outward, taking the project of education into the world outside of the cloistered walls of the monastery (see Willinsky 2010). To the extent that libraries existed at the time, they existed predominantly (in Europe) within the walls of the grandest and best endowed monastic institutions. This is also how both secular and religious institutions of account and import were officially registered with the Holy Roman Empire—the earliest educational accrediting agency (Haskins 1941). So, the vestiges of a twinned system of secular and religious become moored by explicitly denominational concerns.

However, since our interest here is the US educational system, and since the origins of that system are historically more closely aligned with Britain, we continue our examination of the twinned religious—secular educational in the context of British schooling. Fletcher (1997) illuminates the earliest character (and mission) of widespread schooling in English society as largely two-pronged. These were Christian, moralizing institutions, first and foremost, meant to save children from their own inherent bodily evil through the spread of good, well-controlled Christian virtue. Reformation era Protestants utilized the socializing institution of the common school—as well as the growing desire of the bourgeoisie for educated—male—children to justify the promulgation of catechetical institutions that taught (the) discipline(s) through explicit religious instruction. With its fervent emphasis on control over the body and mind ‘the school became more than anything else an instrument of discipline, based on coercion and intended to check youthful high spirits with soled and monotonous learning’ (p. 337). The moral clarion call to education and enlightenment soon drew Stuart and Elizabethan patrons who sought to endow religious institutions meant to combat the perceived moral rot of younger generations. Certainly one might argue for the existence of the monastic tradition of early second millennium Europe as initial tread marks upon the path of formal religious instruction, but we’re concerned here less with the ethereal, unconnected cloister and prefer to focus our gaze upon the fact that these schools, at least in their later iterations, were very much planted in the structures of society, looking to shape it rather than escape from it.

However, the shift from monastic schools—ones which attempted to seclude children from society—to the more modern schools of the Enlightenment which were very much planted in the structures of society, attempting to shape it through an emphasis on secularism, individualism, rationality, and science and their underlying desire to break with religious dogma pervading earlier times, was not (and, as we will argue in the second section of this paper, is still not easily) achieved. This is not because of the inability to separate the religious and the secular in institutional terms but, rather, because the nature of the ‘secular’ was still very much religious, despite the new understandings ushered in by the Enlightenment and other movements that followed.

The English public school, according to Carper (1998), still regarded itself primarily as a vehicle for transmitting the common faith of evangelical Christianity. This ran hand-in-hand with a Puritanical mandate that education must save the—inherently—fallen children. For Puritanism, Archard (1993: 38) suggests ‘conceived of children as essentially prone to a badness which only rigid disciplinary upbringing could correct’. The notion of the fallen child in need of saving both within the family and through the auspices of schooling was one which early Puritan settlers brought with them to our shores (Fletcher 1997)—to New Amsterdam, New York, New England; building Winthrop’s *Cit(ies) Upon a Hill* to serve as new models of Christian purity. One way to combat the Original Sin of ignorance was to beat it out of pupils. Another was to enlighten the child through the implied Divinity of knowledge. The record shows that for a great long time both went hand in hand. Indeed, it mattered very little whether a child be innocent or experienced; both beginnings led, it was feared, to wicked ends and so parents and more specifically schools were cautioned against pampering children who might only survive hellfire if ‘accustomed to strict discipline early in life’ (Aries 1962: 115).

That Jesus, in the Christian Scriptures, is often referred to by the Apostles as ‘rabbi’—or in many translations, ‘teacher’—gave early common school pedagogues reason enough to weave religion into the moral-curricular fabric of what were essentially frontier seminary schools in colonial America. *The New England Primer* was thus their preferred text. The most commonly used educational text in the American colonies, the *Primer* (a likely precursor to the *McGuffey Readers* of 19th century westward expansion fame) at its peak boasted ‘perhaps 3 million copies [printed] . . . Its great theme was God and our relationship to Him’ (Nord 1995: 65). Simple claim here: prime the children to have a relationship to the Christian God as all knowledge came from Him (this exclusively male, white Deity).

However, this is meant, or was begun, as a discussion of religion and public education. These schools—excepting perhaps those efforts of the Jesuits and other evangelizing orders like them—in the Puritanical context of the earliest settlements of a nascent America would not yet have considered the dichotomy between public and private that we see as so stark some 400 years later. Indeed, in the Colonial period, a common schools movement on par with anything seen in contemporary England wouldn’t

quite get underway in the US until Horace Mann took his case on horse-back up and down the Northeast in the mid-1830s.

Even the Common school movement in the mid-19th century, meant to 'create a moral, disciplined, and unified population prepared to participate in American politics' (Carper 1998: 16), still was primarily bent on preparing Americans for participation in a Christian civilization. While, from today's standpoint, we might consider the 'common' and religious schools as separate entities, this was in no way the case at the time. The fact is not only that such a separation was inconceivable then but Protestants, the largest 'common' religious affiliation at the time, could not imagine a 'common' that was not inherently Protestant in nature. As Carper (1998: 16) notes:

with few exceptions. .. Protestants were generally supportive of common schooling. Indeed, many were in the vanguard of the reform movement. They approved of early public schooling because it reflected Protestant beliefs [and] was viewed as an integral part of a crusade to fashion a Christian—which, to the dismay of Roman Catholics, meant Protestant—America.

While the notion that the common school ought to serve as a vehicle of and for Protestantism was one accepted as natural and common-sensical to the Protestant majority in the US at the time, it was not seen as such by the waves of immigrants, some of whom, and in growing numbers, were not Protestant. In other words, the commonality of Protestantism as the basis for the common school was put into question. An objection toward a perceived Protestant bias inbred within the curriculum of municipal public schools, led to the establishment of the first Catholic school system in the United States just after the 1840s (Nord 1995). Coupled with increasing religious freedoms and 'a genial pattern of democratic "secular" thought associated with the Enlightenment' (Marty 2000: 37), this alternate model of schooling created the flashpoint by which public schools were free to move from a Christian denominational spirit to the new doctrine of late 19th century Americanism. This, by 1890, meant that textbooks at the high school level eliminated explicit religious content almost universally. Even *McGuffey Readers* were being shunted to use in private schooling, now for the first time significantly outnumbered by public institutions.

The project of Americanization from the late 19th century onward led to the Progressive era (or rather a movement of progressivism) that put an emphasis on advancing US society, putting faith in expert (scientific) knowledge which could modernize (and industrialize) a burgeoning economy and nation. So we have a movement to comprehensive high schools that educated for what Labaree (1997) might call social efficiency. From here the assumption generally follows that as schooling in America became more sophisticated and widespread, we progressed, as it were, away from teaching religion in schools. Yet the notion that Americanization or progressivism did not eradicate the long-lasting intrusion of religion into schooling—indeed, that religion continued to play a role in education regardless of decades of attempts to secularize and 'modernize'

schools—is best evidenced by the need for a series of court decisions regarding the relationship between religion and schooling in the US.

The foundation of these decisions was established with *Everson v. Board of Election* (Supreme Court 1947), in which, determining that the First Amendment's establishment clause applies to state and, therefore, to local school districts, Justice Hugo Black asserted:

Neither a state nor the Federal Government can... pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. (Nord 1995: 115)

Black's interpretation held (and still holds) great weight and served as the foundation for various court decisions to follow. In *Engle v. Vitale* (Supreme Court 1962), the court determined that school prayer—whether denominational or not—might be construed as a religious activity and was thus unconstitutional. A year later, in *Abington School District v. Schempp*, the Court reiterated its ruling, determining that school-organized prayer, even without comment or explication from teachers or students—is illegal. The *Stone v. Graham* decision banned the display of the Ten Commandments in public schools; and in 1988, in *Lee v. Wiseman*, the court banned religious invocations at public schools graduation ceremonies.

These court rulings were reframed in 1995 by guidelines issued by the US Department of Education regarding religious activity in schools. The guidelines state that student (individual or group) prayer and Bible reading is allowed as long as it is not disruptive, as is the wearing of religious clothing and symbols, as well as limited proselytizing and distribution of religious literature. Banned, according to these guidelines, are teacher- and/or school-endorsed prayer. Teachers, according to these guidelines, may teach about religion but cannot advocate a particular religion. Nor may they encourage either religious or anti-religious activity (Jurinski 2004).

Despite the various court decisions and/or the guidelines by the US Department of Education, we suggest, the echoes, the imprints of religion remain in the hallways—the rhythms, the routines, and the claims to knowledge—of our public schools; in some cases perhaps in more muted forms, but present nonetheless. Courts can regulate application of the law, they cannot, however, regulate culture—that of schooling or that of the larger society that gives rise and meaning to what takes place within schools. In other words, while the courts can take theology out of the curriculum, expunge religious manifestations explicitly identified as such in schools; they cannot take religiosity out of people or de-couple culture from its religious roots.

With this in mind, our interest in the remainder of this paper is less concerned with teaching about religion or teaching religion itself, but rather with whether or not we choose to attend to the religion that is already always taught in our public schools, not through content *per-se* but through the culture of discourses and pedagogical practices of every-day life in American education. In many ways, we suggest, this teaching, while

not a part of the explicit curriculum, is as powerful in conveying messages to students as those intended by the school's explicit curriculum.

Religious sediments in educational discourses and practices

Although teaching religion in schools is no longer permitted according to court decisions, we use this paper to illustrate that religious understandings—intended or not—still very much pervade what we do in the name of education today.

There are, admittedly, numerous levels upon which to engage in a discussion of what we're to take away from the selective-historical-argument as presented above. We will suggest two. Both address the fundamental (no pun intended) assumptions about religion's role in contemporary American public schooling; one centres more on the structures and trappings of the typical makeup of a school (its organisation, its processes, its language), the other attempts to explore the role of disciplining students' bodies and conceptions of the 'child' that we see as inherently tied to the religious ancestry of today's institutions that inform and, in doing so, also form, our students' minds and bodies to be disciplined, to yield to authority, to comply, to suffer guilt for actions, and to absorb ideology—scientific, religious, or otherwise—without complaint.

It is tempting, of course, to explicate solely that which is most apparent: that we remain on a school calendar which blatantly privileges Christian holidays; that our public schools are often guided by mission statements; that we still speak of recitation very much rooted in oral religious traditions. These things matter and certainly they are worthy of our attention. However, if we're to discuss religion's role in education, we must also explore the core values and assumptions that underlie those practices. We address these and other issues below.

Calendar

We all, as a matter of fact, commonly use the qualifiers B.C. and A.D. (or their modern equivalents of B.C.E and C.E) to determine the chronology of events. To most of us, Feeney (2007: 7) notes, 'These numerical dates seem to be written in nature, but they are based on a Christian era of year counting whose contingency and ideological significance are almost always invisible to virtually every European or American, except when we hesitate over whether to say B. C. or B.C.E.'. However, while the notations B.C. (Before Christ) and A.D. (Anno Domini—to the year of the Lord) have now been replaced with B.C.E (Before the Common Era) and C.E. (Common Era), this division, while attempting to extrapolate its religious—Christian—referent, in fact entrenches it even further. Abandoning the explicit referent to Christ, the division based on his (very much contested) date of birth still remains implicit. Implied is not only the marking of his birth as the dividing line between 'before' and 'after',

but also the idea that such a division is, and thus should be regarded, as 'common', a taken for granted that ought to apply to all.

That notion of subsuming a Christian sensibility as common-sense, one that, having been laundered of its explicit religious connotation should now apply to all—Christians, Jews, Moslems, Buddhists—underlies not only our, by now 'common', division of time but also its organization into what we have come to call a calendar. Or perhaps we ought to say *the* calendar, since the calendar currently most used around the world is the Gregorian calendar, otherwise referred to as the Western Calendar or Christian calendar or, in short, the common or civil calendar. This calendar was introduced in 1582 by Pope Gregory XIII after whom it was named. Although Christian by design and religious by a papal decree, this calendar is now considered 'common' or 'civil', occluding its Christian theological origins in the mantle of the civic, an instrument to be appropriated by and serve the common and the civil, regardless of religious or civic persuasion. Christianity, it seems, has been able, among other things, to appropriate the very essence of time enumeration and its management, while allowing that appropriation to become invisible, seeming natural and apolitical to most of those using it.

However, the enumeration of time through calendars—Gregorian or any other—is never neutral; it is ideological and political in nature, organizing time and activities in particular ways as they advance some at the expense of others. As such, calendars are inherently curricular, charting a course (a curriculum) to regulate bodies in time and space. An academic calendar is no exception. A case in point: Ramadan began, in 2009, on the 22nd of August and ran until the 20th of September. This was, for the students at the majority of American schools on a semester system, concurrent with the first month of the school year. The daylight fasting called for among devout Muslims means adapting the cycle of the body to a schedule that requires that consumptive and circadian rhythms run counter to the traditional work and school routines of daily life. Hanukkah, in 2010, began on 1 December, and ended on 9 December, a time when universities and schools are mired in the semester's requisite final exams period. And, although, as with Islamic students, those sons and daughters of Israel are within their rights as university students to miss classes in the service of religious observation, it is the very fact that they must actively excuse themselves from classes (and be responsible for making up for the lost curriculum) amidst periods deemed significant both in their religious traditions and their academic preparation that bears note here.

This phenomenon, of course, is not unique to the US Academic calendars. Public schools disadvantage religious minority students everywhere. In Israel, which schedules its calendar around the Jewish holidays, students of the Moslem and Christian faiths endure similar difficulties, as do Christian students in countries of Moslem faith. The difference, however, is that none of those countries purport to have separated church—or, in their case, synagogue or mosque—from state. Though Although the US has, the fact that Christian holidays are the ones accommodated by the academic calendar in the US ought to be explored. Other than the

rather archaic drawback to our agrarian past, which still demands a long summer vacation to allow students to help during the harvesting season, our two other major breaks, although they are now often referred to as winter break rather than Christmas break and spring break rather than Easter break, nevertheless centre around Christmas and Easter. Our point here is not to challenge this particular configuration—which is probably more reflective now of cultural rather than religious sensibilities—but to point to the fact that it is taken for granted as a form of curriculum and, as such, requires further considerations as to the degree to which it both advances particular religious/cultural practices and disadvantages others.

Our argument, fundamentally, is that the American school year is oriented toward, and indeed pivots around the rhythms of the Christian (and, in the case of week-ends, a Judeo-Christian) ecclesiastical calendar. Certainly those most faithful to tradition among us will note that there are more important—by weight of theological significance—holidays within the traditions discussed. Easter. Rosh Hashanah. Mawlid al-Nabi. Yet it is Christmas which remains the fulcrum upon which our school year turns. We would do well to ask why. Probably one could make an argument for the linkage between Christmas as religious observation and Christmas as Cultural and civil observation, but that is beyond the purview of our work here. Rather we seek to note the important fact that when students wish to worship outside of public schools, as mandated by our Supreme Court, only those who are of Christian faith might do so without making their own special accommodations for the time and space required. The calendar of the public schools in the USA remains very much in service of the subtle and not not-so so-subtle Christian religiosity of the educational project. It is thus easy to remain invisibly Christian in our schools because the holidays come to you; one must, at the inconvenience of employer, teacher, and student all, become overtly Jewish, blatantly Muslim, to maintain many rituals of faith.

That schools (public or universities) schedule themselves around what could basically be considered a Christian or Judeo-Christian calendar is one thing. That such a calendar is taken as self-evident, natural, and above questioning by those of us in education is quite another. For beyond the disadvantage such a calendar poses to some (many?) students and teachers, taking this (any) calendar for granted highlights not simply the dominance of one religion in our educational arena but also the naturalness in which it manifests itself. Like the cases of gender and race, that which is not considered problematic by those being advantaged by the system indicates both the degree to which benefits are easily accessible to some at the expense of others as well as the blindness that results from those benefits for those most privileged.

Recognizing that calendars based on the Jewish or Moslem religion, as noted earlier, disprivilege those from other religions, we are not suggesting abandoning the existing school calendar. Our point is not to simply replace one calendar with another. Rather, it is to raise awareness to the religious aspects underlying calendars and the degree to which, despite current policies that accommodate religious difference in some ways, the

very nature of a calendar—in the case of the US, a Christian-based one—always already creates Others.

Language as curriculum/the curriculum of language

Curriculum expresses itself through language but is also formed by it. That is, while every curriculum uses language in order to orient people within it, suggesting a course for thought, action, and desire, the very language used in that process becomes a curriculum of sort, directing those it engages toward particular understandings, assumptions, perspectives, and identifications. In that regard, language and the broader discourses informing it matter both *in* curriculum and *as* a curriculum.

Operating in and as a curriculum, discourses make particular versions and visions of the world meaningful and intelligible. Providing a ‘conceptual order to our perceptions, points of view, investments, and desires’ (Britzman 1991: 57), discourses are the organizing structures that make the world intelligible and possible. Discourses and the discursive practices that go along with them, Foucault (1977: 199) noted, define ‘a legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge, and the fixing of norms for the elaboration of concepts and theories’. As such, Foucault added, discursive practices are not simply ‘ways of producing discourse. They are embodied in technical processes, in institutions, in patterns of general behaviour, in forms for transmission and diffusion, and in pedagogical forms which, at once, impose and maintain them’ (pp. 199–200). Any system of education, Foucault (1972/1981) proposed, is a way of maintaining or modifying the appropriation of discourse, along with the power and knowledge they carry. Indeed, discourses, Luke and Gore (1992) suggest, define the classroom and ‘are key to the production of subjectivity, identity and knowledge in pedagogical encounters’ (p. 2, see also Phelan 1994). Decisions made regarding language use—choosing this term rather than another, this imagery instead of another—transmit certain values and, thus, to borrow from Popkewitz (1987: 340), ‘impose ways of giving shape and organisation to consciousness’.

Exposing the assumptions and ideologies underlying the conventions and everyday practices in education (Kincheloe 1993: 30) and the degree to which what is privileged may be historically and conventionally pre-inscribed and prescribed (Aronowitz and Giroux 1991: 140), as well as the interests they serve, to use Lather (1992), allows us to examine ‘the lack of innocence in any discourse’ (p. 120) by looking at the effects of language on giving meaning to experience. Such an approach, as Mohanty (1986) advocates, seeks ‘to suspend the taken-for-granted process of... continuity’ (p. 233) and question the self-evidence of meaning in our discourses.

If language matters and it permeates and colours social systems, then the idea that elements of language used in education have their roots in religion, we believe, ought to matter too if, as the above literature suggests, language, both explicitly and implicitly, orients us to think and be in the world in particular ways. Many of the examples we provide, relating educational

discourse to its Christian roots, may seem so innocent, matter-of-fact—indeed, regarded as secular inventions—that that any reference to their Christian roots may appear odd or insignificant to anyone rooted in current-day educational practices. Yet tracing their origins, we suggest, allow us to see the residues colouring current educational practices and the possible meanings, affiliations, and positions they invite.

And so we turn to some examples of terms—dean, rector, mission, colloquy, discipline, among others—currently apolitically circulating in educational discourse, ones most of us tend to take for granted as neutral, secular, and unaffected by ideology and history. Christian ideology and history. While universities and some schools have ‘deans’ and many universities have rectors—both considered secular administrative positions—their roots are well established in church organizational structures. A dean, now a head of a college, is also defined as the head of a ‘chapter of a cathedral at a collegiate church’ and a rector as ‘a priest in charge of a church or a religious institution’. Assuming that schools and universities are no longer overtly religious institutions and have no connection to cathedrals, the fact that those administering education within secular institution still carry the legacy of religious affiliations ought to matter—indeed, invite some pause—when we consider the assumed separation of religion and education. Similarly, although the term ‘convocation’ is currently used to portray a graduation ceremony (usually smaller than commencement) and, in other cases, the body of alumni (or a representative committee of it), its original use is based in church clerical procedures of assembly. Objects used in such ceremonies are equally related. Academic gowns, hoods, and caps, once the attire of clergy, are now used by faculty in a venue adorned with gonfalons, long flags or banners suspended from a crosspiece. Gonfalons, now commonplace in secular educational institutions, were originally used by religious groups gathered for devotional purposes in order to gain divine favour from God, Jesus, Mary, and the saints portrayed on these gonfalons. Admittedly, the use of such terms and objects by current-day secular institutions has probably more to do with these institutions’ cultural affiliations to their ancestry in medieval, church-based universities than to any explicit religious proselytizing. Yet, such connections, and their display in current practise nevertheless conveys implicit ideological messages to both students and faculty.

Whether or how the Christian roots of the above terms and objects matters to those working within educational settings might vary, but the idea that we continuously convey religious sediments in our daily use of these terms and the ideological and pedagogical positions those invite for ourselves and our students, including those who are not Christian, ought to require some pause in institutions that tend to define themselves as secular and who have made various efforts to otherwise ensure the separation of religion and education and regularly insist, based on established court decisions, on refraining from promoting religion. What the use of such terms demonstrates is that, while overt promotion of religious belief might indeed be avoided, implicit messages read critically, regarding religion—and Christianity in particular—seem ever present regardless of the above-mentioned efforts.

The legacy of Christianity, however, goes beyond administrative and ceremonial aspects of contemporary educational institutions. Take, for example, a mundane term such as the ‘office’, the hub of the school and the symbol of its power and authority to which students are often sent to report and repent their sins. As the Oxford Dictionary suggests, the term could be considered, as most of us now do, merely a room ‘used for non-manual work’. However, what happens when one considers the dictionary’s other definition of the word as ‘the services of prayers and psalms said daily by Catholic priests or other clergy’ and the possible relationship between the two definitions?

One of the first practices of institutions facing accreditation is to elucidate a simultaneously specific and vague mission—‘a series of special religious services for increasing religious devotion and converting unbelievers’(!)—statement for a school.⁴ In order to do so, a dean might impress upon the faculty the need for a colloquy—‘a church court composed of the pastors and representative elders of the churches of a district, with judicial and legislative functions over these churches’—whereby the congregation—‘A general assembly of the members of a University, or of such of them as possess certain specified qualifications’, but also, ‘a body of persons assembled for religious worship or to hear a preacher’—of teachers or professors—‘one[s] who [have] taken the vows of a religious order’—might better elucidate for outside observers (and themselves perhaps, too) just what it is they *do* all day. This gathering will most certainly, at the tertiary level, divide along the lines of colleges (within a given university) and will divide further by discipline—which is drawn from the term ‘disciple’—and of course certain colleagues—‘a body of clergy living together on a foundation for religious service or similar activity’—will sit nearer each other as personal relationships fracture the (now tense) room.

The notion that the language used in education has its roots in religion is, considering the historical connection of schooling (and universities) to the church, unavoidable. It nonetheless, we argue, deserves more careful attention. Such attention, of course, cannot rest simply with the origins and contours of individual words; it must also explore the idea that our educational discourse, that which for Bakhtin (1994) is authoritative by its very official nature, will colour (ever so subtly, even, but still the faintest shading matters) our possible perceptions. That the linguistic markers of education are so replete with buried 4th and 5th century meanings rooted in (Christian) church proceedings and ideology suggests a need to examine just what this does to the practices of schooling in the US. We propose that it very much leads to, as does the formal allowance for Christian holidays in scheduling, a normalized and not-so-silent authoritative religious discourse. How else to explain the profusion of (Christian, after all) sports teams named Knights, Crusaders, and variously hued-Devils representing our public schools in caricatured effigy, symbolizing, by definition, to the world that which schools value and what they stand for? While we leave an examination of the often troubling culture of school sports to others, we wish to suggest that naming is significant and, in the case of the above, sends powerful messages about the

religious values underlying the chosen names; ones that might be especially problematic for, say, a Jewish or Moslem student or teacher whose ancestors were often (too often) subject to persecution by, for example, knights during the various Crusades.

The apple as metaphor

It might be said, as with other troubling endeavours in this world, that our work of theorizing this piece began with the apple. We won't devolve into accusations as to who was serpent, who guileless Eve, who hapless puppet Adam. However, the apple, an image so present in religion as a symbol of that which was possible and lost is, too, synonymous with education. Think, if you will, of all those shining red apples taking up space on teachers' desks (and holiday trees), or the image of an apple adorning the covers of so many books in education, educational websites, and other school-related paraphernalia.

It is best to admit here that very little has been conceptualized regarding such religious connections. Often the gift of the literal apple is tied to modes of payment offered for services rendered by poor, farming families to teachers in lieu of monetary remuneration. Perhaps and probably. Although why, despite certainly other modes of payment-in-foodstuff, does the apple survive as our most insistent symbol of teaching? Why are (were) students perceived as seeking favour called 'apple-polishers' and not 'grain proffers'? 'Potato Pushers'? We will argue that this has to do with an underlying theological assumption of what teachers do: they bring knowledge. To get there, we will need to revisit Genesis, apt, one supposes, as it was to have been the beginning anyways.

The apple, in that great patriarchal tale of woman-as-downfall-of-man,⁵ is actually a geographical anachronism. If we are to believe that the Fertile Crescent at some point contained the Garden from which man and woman were expelled, then it's more likely they would have supped at the base of a Tamarind (Enoch 32:4) or perhaps fig tree if we're to take their hasty choice of clothing against a newfound nakedness as a guide (Genesis 3:7). The truth is, we just don't know exactly what fruit it was that tore a rent in paradise because it's never specified. Textually, all that is said is that those first forebears ate of the tree of knowledge—later become in some traditions, the tree of knowledge of good and evil⁶—the rest is open for interpretation. Or at least it was, until Renaissance art fixed the apple in the collective western consciousness. One theory as to the link comes from the etymology of the Latinate for 'apple' (*malus*) and 'evil' (*malum*) which both become 'mala' in the plural. Perhaps our imaginations have been limited by a long lost misinterpretation. It matters little, though, as the greater point is that the apple has been—for centuries now—linked with knowledge and thus, in the process, with teaching.

What is being said, then, when one gives a teacher an apple or some representation of the fruit? What messages are conveyed? One might hope that one is not paying homage to our being led into a fall from grace. Chevalier (1994) suggests that the symbol is 'that of knowledge and of

being placed under the obligation to make a choice (p. 37). So it seems that perhaps we polishers out there are attending to the gift of the potential of knowing everything (from good, all the way to evil). Always, though, these assertions are couched in a religious context, referencing the first encounter—a tragic one—of humans and god and of disobedience and its consequences for knowledge and knowing. However, also of seduction of the forbidden and, above all, of the trickery of unclear instructions and of parties unaware of them but still expected to act in particular ways. Regardless of what has changed in schooling as we have moved from Biblical to Civil religion, the apple remains, still informing the way we conceive of the gift of knowledge that ought be school. And so do the couplings of religion and schooling, knowledge and obedience, virtue and sin, fallen and saved. This interplay between and among these various couplings, as evinced in the body of the fruit of knowledge, mirrors conflicted notions of education and of the student encountering it. We thus turn now to the ways in which education has dealt/still struggles with the issue of the child as fallen/saved. History and religion, as the next section illustrates, continue to undergird our current educational conceptualizations of and processes for dealing with these conflicted images of the child and how those ought to be addressed in the process of education.

The Child child as innocent and deviant

Mintz (2006) might well be writing of current pedagogues, when he notes that our Puritan forebears ‘were convinced that moulding children through proper childrearing and education was the most effective way to shape an orderly and godly society’ (p. 10). However, what does such a moulding entail? In which direction does it desire? Answers, naturally, depend on the conception of childhood one holds—that is, on our understandings of what and who children are and, thus, what process is necessary in order to equip them for the kind of adulthood we envision for them.

The very idea of childhood, as Aries (1962) has illustrated, is a modern concept. Aries points to early medieval artistic representations of children as small adults in both musculature and facial features as an indication that the notion of the child simply didn’t exist as we might understand it, from our post-Dr. Spock perches in time. He continues, asserting that ‘childhood was’, in pre-1400s Europe, ‘simply an unimportant phase of which there was no need to keep any record’ (p. 38) as too many of these miniature adults died too young to be considered ‘whole’ or feasible.⁷ More useful, for our purposes, in Aries’ analysis, is his notation of an evolution of focus in paintings of (what we’re calling here) children around the 16th and 17th centuries where cherubic babies, flush with matriarchal-love and nuzzling these same virginal mothers, evoked both an image of Christian piety-cum-purity, but also ‘childhood’ as ‘graceful or picturesque’ (p. 38).

Here we see, to our knowledge, the earliest versions of Blake’s tiny and lisping waif, ‘weep, weeping’ into his mother’s bosom: Romanticism’s

muse on canvas. This is what Jenks (1996) termed the Apollonian child. Named after Apollo, the Greek god of light and the sun, truth and prophecy, music, poetry, and the arts, this creative, handsome—the perfect conception of man—ideal is seen as a ‘wondrous innocent, full of love and deserving to be loved in turn’ (p. 60). This ‘Apollonian child’ was ‘humankind before either Eve [and Adam] or the apple’ (p. 73). It is an image of the child later cultivated by philosophers and educators such as Rousseau, A. S. Neil, and Pestalozzi, as well as the one taken up by much of Progressive education, both past and present.

The Apollonian’s other—what Jenks defines as the Dionysian child—is named after Dionysus, the Greek god of wine, of ritual madness and pleasure and ecstasy and the one associated with drunkenness, madness, and unrestrained sexuality. For Jenks, ‘the Dionysian child’ is seen as rife with ‘an initial evil or corruption [from] within’ an image ‘buttress[ed]’ by ‘the doctrine of Adamic original sin’ (p. 70). ‘A severe view of the child’, Jenks adds, ‘is a sustained, one that saw socialization as almost a battle but certainly a form of combat where the headstrong and stubborn subject had to be “broken”, but all for their own good’ (p. 71). This second, darker half of the child, which comes sooted and soiled later as religious concerns begin to impugn on the afore-assumed squeaky soul of the child, is in need of cleansing, purification, and fixing. It is a devilish child requiring discipline and obedience, the one found more readily in Dickensian depictions of childhood and, regrettably, in many conservative notions of education today that are replete with memorization and recitation, high stakes testing, tracking, and the death of the arts, the humanities, as well as creativity and independent thought.

For Puritanism, Archard (1993: 38) suggests ‘conceived of children as essentially prone to a badness which only rigid disciplinary upbringing could correct’; the blushed and naked whelp it seems, required structure, for its innocence was not earned and ‘the innocence of the child [was] an empty one (p. 37). The sin of experience lay like a Tyger set to pounce from the inside, the unkempt, undisciplined soul, kept only (barely) at bay by the habitual piety that came to be associated with school and schooling.

If, as the Reverend Benjamin Wadsworth put it, ‘babies [were] “filthy, guilty, odious, abominable . . . both by nature and practise”’ (Mintz 2006: 11), then the duty of society was to civilize, moralize, and in the process save the babe, mired in sin though it may have been. Schools were expected, according to Reverend John Wesley, to ‘break the will of [the] child’ and ‘bring his will into subjection that it may afterward be subject to the will of God’ (Hendrick 1992: 36). And the work of breaking the young ‘required upon pain of punishment, usually physical, a form of behaviour, accompanied by a set of related attitudes, which reinforced the child’s dependence and vulnerability’ and deference (p. 46) as well as submission and subjugation. New here is the sense that school—and only that kind which transmitted specific religious moral codes—might bring some hope and that lost innocence of the great Fall back to the child. However, only if the child became dependent and vulnerable, silent and unquestioning under threat of the pain of the switch; also too, though,

the pain of eternal hellfire. Here, note, the teacher became proxy for both parent and minister, imbued with both the power to save and damn in the same breath.

While there are certainly some elements of the innocent, Apollonian child in contemporary educational thought, substantial elements of the religiously-inspired, inherently evil, Dionysian child remain in our schools today (Jenks 1996, 2001). While we must now spare the physical rod, the religiously-inspired goad of shame and compulsory discipline still reigns, even if in different form, in the hallways of even our most celebrated schools. No longer do we hang the albatross of a literal lake of fire over the heads of our most unwilling students, no we're—we think—perhaps more subtle. Our saved students have their names on honour rolls in hallways, for the shamed to walk beneath, look at, and know they are fallen. And those sinners of the modern era, what to do with them? We send them to detention! With penance to pay so that they might leave cleansed, having confessed through the weight of time in that great purgative state. The idea is that, though we've let loose the rhetoric and formal proclamations of the odious and UnChristian barbaric child behind, the processes of schooling still trace a clear lineage to a religious past that brings to bear the necessary moral guidance through which a(ll) wicked child(ren) might be made clean. That requires, as above, submission and subjugation. For 'education involves trust, hope, and faith, and it is guided by a search for wisdom that entails values that can only be called religious' (Webb 2000: 101). Trust, hope, and faith all require 'leaps' and often can be preceded by the word 'blind'. We are still seeking, as John Wesley asserted, it seems, bent and broken wills, silently accepting the very notion that education (just as God before it) knows best. Students who do best by the measures which are said to matter—grades, test scores, attendance—are those whose wills are most deferent to the formal workings of a school. Questioning is impeded by the sacred works of the school. Just as the Bible before was divinely inspired, so too are textbooks often written 'as if their authors did not exist at all', as if they were simply 'transcribing official truths' (Schrag, 1967: 74; cf. Wineburg 1991: 511). Divinity, it appears, has come to Houghton Mifflin.

The task of schools, it's implied, is to figure how to deal with the mirth-gorged Dionysius and the timorous but noble Apollo—both of which seem to reside, simultaneously, within the same child. At the crossroads between diametrically opposed visions of childhood, schooling has had to mediate for methods of control. When schooling in America was an explicitly religious endeavour, no solution was needed as the innocent child simply did not exist, for Original Sin told us so. As the grip of church on school loosened, progressive educational theories mushroomed, proffering ideals of unstructured and self-guided, free-play 'learning,' for better and worse some would argue (see Montessori and Whole Language). Having swung to both extremes, the needle of influence seems to have settled somewhere in the middle in a debate about, say, a structured or unstructured school day. What we'll note, though, is this: that the fading influence of something so extreme as bodily corporal punishment (linked in our work above with Puritanical asceticism) does not mean the

assumptions underlying such a practise have disappeared from the halls of our schools; although the welts and bruises fade, recall, their (un)remembered effects remain. It's not so important, then, how we punish our students, it's that we do so at all. Because this assumes that school is, regardless of the Grecian archetype of the child, still ever about control and punishment and discipline and the possibility of redemption. If this is true, and we take it to be, then the very anchors upon which schooling is based are, and perhaps always will be, explicitly theological regardless of whether a Bible ever finds its way onto a teacher's desk.

Organizing the body

While schools are considered first and foremost places of learning, they are, at the same time, organizing systems that regulate students. And nothing is more regulated in schools than the student's body. It is informed what it can and cannot adorn. It is required to move from room to room through narrow corridors, made to sit behind desks, and required, regardless of weather, to exit the building during recess. Its bodily functions are regulated—one needs a teacher's permission to go to the bathroom. It is regulated as to when to learn and when to play (and a confusion of the two is often reason for punishment), when to move around and when to sit still. It is made to line up and follow, to be silent, compliant, and, most of all, obedient.⁸ It's made to be a transient body with no roots (other than the student's locker) as it gets shuffled every 50 minutes from one location to another, rendering it a body in exile in its own (supposed) home—the school. We point here to the idea of the body because, as Lewis (1993) points out, the body of knowledge that comprises the curriculum and the body experience of being schooled 'are not separable from each other' (p. 186). What we learn through our mind impacts our understanding of the body—how we perceive it, how and when we do or don't activate it, how we learn to live with and in it—and that which is learned through the body has long-lasting implications for what is possible and imaginable intellectually. The two work hand in hand, both opening and closing possibilities for the other. So while we tend to think of schools as places designed primarily for the learning of the mind, it is important to also consider what the body learns in that process and, in the context of this paper, the degree to which and how the regulation of the student body and its implications might be rooted in religious thought and practise. After all, whether Dionysian or Apollonian, the child, it has been decided, must be schooled. It must be civilized.

As Nespor (1997: 131) points out, 'the civilized body' in public education 'is a schooled body, one that stays silent, walks in line, keeps its hands to itself, and doesn't get out of its chair and walk around the room'. This vision of singular, orderly, mortified bodies (no physical contact, recall) is, of course, value-laden and historically bound. Foucault (1977) argues that the practise of education is imbued with a cellularization of students' lives rooted deeply in the disciplinary traditions of monastic Europe. 'The classroom', he argues, is 'a fundamental stage and script for

childhood', one filled with various technologies of organization meant always to surveil (as cited in Jenks 1998: 98).

These technologies of surveillance, for Foucault, render control of the body as paramount. This control is most often organized around time-worn ideas linked to church, clergy, and morality. Why else ought we have organized students in rows, so many pews facing towards the great altar of the teacher's desk? There are ties to Lancasterian monitoring, certainly, but in what guiding ethos is this ultimately rooted? The underlying assumption is that students are fallen and prone to unseemly distraction (tempted even) and in need of the discipline of a pr/t/eacher who might set them straight. And they are to submit to the order of it, just as in church, silent, again in rows, and listening to someone else hold forth. Step out of line (that which one might just be toeing), and the student faces recrimination. Discipline.

Of this, Jenks (2001) hones in on the Foucaultian analysis of the timetable defined as 'the device . . . of monastic origin' which 'relates to the regular division' of the day. This division, both argue, becomes the systemic extension of control through the creation of a rhythm around which tasks, duty, and life become organized (p. 73).

Back to the monks again, tonsured on a redolent meadow of antiquity, copying illustrated manuscripts, and unknowingly laying the groundwork for children miles and centuries away: celled off (into classrooms), timed (bells for both), and confessing (to abbot and teacher).

The time-table, Jenks (2001: 73) notes, is an inheritance:

The strict model was no doubt suggested by the monastic communities. It soon spread. Its three great methods—establish rhythms, impose particular occupations, regulate the cycle of repetition—were soon to be found in schools, workshops, and hospitals. The new disciplines had no difficulty in taking up their place in the old forms; the schools and poorhouses extended the life and the regularity of the monastic communities to which they were often attached.

A break in routine, a disruption in the cycle caused by a student, is what leads, ultimately, to explicit discipline at the hands of the teacher. This is, recall, about the regulation of behaviour. The ritual of the repetition of school mirrors quite easily that ritual that drives religious ceremony. In this light, it is a small leap to think of the teacher taking on the role of clergy, particularly in terms of punishment and absolution, themes Foucault locates in the history and practise of confession.

'At their best', Webb (2000: 124) suggests, 'confessors are educators, teaching people how to reform their lives'. As for Foucault (1990), confession becomes a trope for truth, indeed, a trope for human nature itself: 'Western man has become a confessional animal' (p. 59). It is thus possible to see the role of clergy into which teachers have so easily stepped. That is, all that remains of monasticism characterized in schooling today: the need to discipline bodies along a timetable, the desire for submission to a single entity of power at the head of a cellular building, and ultimately the requirement that students confess in order to be saved. All this probably further influences the lives of our students than mandatory prayer ever

could. For the overall implication is that they are ever in the practise of what used to be prayer, these latter day unknowing oblates and novices. School itself, as constructed, requires very much of them that is inherently, historically, and disciplinarily religious, even though the content learned might be altogether secular. In that light, the Oxford Dictionary's second definition of the office (as in the principal's office) as not only a room but also as 'the services of prayers and psalms said daily by Catholic priests or other clergy' will hopefully seem less odd here than when earlier introduced. After all, and despite a continuous effort to eradicate religion from education, the two seem connected at so many levels that simply taking out prayer or religious symbols might prove insufficient for the task.

Schooling, as the work on the implicit (or 'hidden') curriculum (Jackson 1968; Giroux 1981, Apple 1982, Eisner 1985) has demonstrated, is not simply about what is taught but also about how things are taught and the relationship between the two. In that regard, while the explicit curriculum *in* schools may have been successfully laundered of its religious content, the curriculum *of* schools—the explicit and implicit language and practices through which curriculum is lived, as well as the assumptions and routines structuring daily life in schools—have not. These latter aspects, as we have shown, are still very much rooted in religious—Christian—understandings and practices, all of which help inscribe particular ideological notions both on and through the student mind and body. In that regard, while you can take education out of the hands of religion through the establishment of a secular, public school system, it is much more difficult, considering the historical roots of education in the church, to take religion out of education.

Discussion

Understanding, as we do, that the US is predominantly Christian—whether through religious persuasion or cultural affiliation—and not wishing to assume the role of the 'political correctness police', our intent here is not to suggest that the language and artifacts of Christian roots used in current educational practices be replaced. Simply replacing them, in the fashion of calling Easter Break, Spring Break will achieve little (although symbolism does result in something). Rather, and assuming these practices, which have been with us for centuries and will probably outlast all of us, what we are calling for is their critical examination in light of the assumed separation between religion and education and the degree to which those Christian sediments convey particular messages to those we attempt to educate.

With that in mind, the fact that we divide our school days into small chunks marked by distinct movement through various disciplinary approaches (math, then social studies, then English, etc.) in a school further divided into classrooms along corridors, reminiscent of monastic cellular organizational patterns isn't, of itself, problematic. Left unexamined, however, its inherent religious character—around which we organize how education happens—remains a low humming below the rhetoric of schools

purportedly made unreligious. Unless we acknowledge that all of education is theological in character (if only by dint of its own organization, language, and practices and in how it organizes student bodies) then talk of religion in (or out of) school is limited to surface and perhaps by comparison, unimportant discussions about prayer in school. Which in turn severely hamstringing the possibility of fruitful discussions of what role religion ought to (or does already) play in the schooling of and for children.

What we are seeking here is the beginning of a discussion. Or, to use another term, a conversation, which, probably unsurprisingly in light of this paper, is rooted etymologically in the term 'conversion'. At our most ambitious, we aim to reposition, to rotate, the debate that allows Nord (1995: 5) to ask, 'What hearing should *live* religious voices receive in public schools and universities?'. The point is not to convert the reader to a position but rather to elucidate from different and perhaps un(der)examined angles, the character of religion in education. To suggest that the impacts of religion on education have been merely ephemeral in nature and thus so easily weeded out by the perceived secularization of the curricula of public schools as well as through the litigious work of the courts is to take both an ahistorical view of education as well as one that focuses on the explicit curricular aspects of schooling while ignoring the implicit curriculum lurking below. It is to forget that although silt settles at the bottom of a river, it is still there colouring the water flowing above and through it. We mean, again, not to suggest that religion negatively affects schooling *per se*—although the restrictive practices drawn from what we've shown, quite often do. Nor do we advocate for the expulsion of whatever vestiges of our longstanding theocracy remain in the halls of American schools. Rather we wish to highlight the ways that Christianity 'makes itself visible and invisible' so that we might better see how the supposed commonsensical 'nothingness' that gets 'taken for granted' (Segall 2002: 135) as normal (and thus normalizing) might be better used (or repudiated) in the national project that is education. In that regard, we are not suggesting that religion in schools is problematic in itself but that leaving its manifestations largely unexplored just might be. For the discourses and daily practices of schools are perhaps as, if not more, educative, even if in different ways, than explicit religious instruction. Put differently, this is not an argument about whether we should teach (about) religion in schools; it is a suggestion that we already do and would thus be best served to begin acknowledging how and to what extent.

To this end, Peskowitz (1997: 711) suggests that 'Christianity's others cannot feel welcome, despite additions and changes to the curriculum, if the ethos does not change'. This is a sentiment we would mirror. We add, however, that Christianity's 'self'—the majority of those in education who identify as Christians—is as much implicated in this 'othering' as those being 'othered'. Indeed, we would suggest that such an exploration is probably more necessary not for the 'other' who is continuously made aware, through his/her 'otherness', of the degree to which, and how, Christianity pervades education, but to those whose Christian cultural or religious affiliations prevent them from seeing that which underlies what they perceive as natural and thus neutral in education.

To embark on this journey of de-naturalizing the Christian sediments in public education, we might ask the same questions of religion that we, as educators, have come to ask of gender, race, sexuality, and socioeconomic class—among many other political identities that come to matter in and affect classrooms—in educational scholarship. This de-naturalization seeks to challenge Christianity's perceived invisibility in education. To suggest that schools are secular, we argue, is to ignore the underlying ethos that a millennia of religion has embossed on and imbedded in the process of school(ed) learning.

Because the very character of education is about the transmission of valued knowledge, values, and, yes, character, we suggest that religion matters to how schools come to function and to the education and character they help produce. As scholars in the field of Teacher Education, we feel that there is both room and a need for more substantive conversations about the ways religion might be critically engaged most particularly in the preparation of future teachers, the very audience for which an analysis of how religion plays in both the macro and micro levels is imperative if teachers are to understand education and its practices in more meaningful ways. One avenue for such an exploration is to recognize religion more deliberately as one of the categories—like race, gender, class, or sexuality—that play an important role in the construction of education and its practices. Indeed diversity has become a widely acknowledged portion of most all teacher preparation programmes as well as in the standards of [US] national organizations like the National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education.⁹ Yet the tendency in such courses and standards is to avoid recognizing or addressing the impact and implications that religion and religious diversity carry in ways that we have come to believe that gender or race or class or sexuality do. Part of this might be due to an over-determined assumption that, although race and gender might be socially constructed, we are still 'born' into such (always shifting) categories. Religion, on the other hand, is considered a familial or personal institution conveyed less organically through practise rather than biology or one's parents' economic status. Regardless, we believe, the impact and role of religion as a category of difference acts similarly in educational contexts and should, thus, be ripe for similar analysis and consideration.

In that regard, we believe religion ought to be addressed in Teacher Education by exploring how it may impact both the individual/personal and institutional levels of/in education. At the personal level (that is, at the level of the individual teacher), and following much of the literature in multicultural teacher education, we suggest more deliberate explorations of whether and how religion impacts how teachers think about the goals, purposes, processes, and outcomes of education as well as whether and how it influences teachers' decisions about curriculum and instruction in classrooms. If one believes, as we and many others in education do, that a teacher's worldview and values impact their practise, then further reflection in teacher education about the origins of those worldviews and values and their impact (possible and real) in classrooms seems necessary.

A study by Schweber (2006), which examined the teaching of the Holocaust in classrooms taught by Jewish and Christian teachers, illus-

trates that the topic was approached very differently, depending on the teacher's particular religious affiliations. White's (2009) study about the connection between teachers' religious identifications and their teaching, conducted with six teachers (three Christian, three Jewish) in a public, elementary school further illustrates this point. According to White, 'teachers were motivated to teach, in part, because of their religious beliefs'. In the case of one of the Christian teachers studied, teaching was a way to both model and reflect the love of God in the everyday (p. 17). One of the Jewish teachers emphasized her responsibility to make the world a better place by fulfilling—and integrating into her classroom—the notion of *Tikkun Olam* (repairing the world through social action) (pp. 13–14).

Teachers' religious perspectives on eternal salvation, human responsibility, sin, and forgiveness, White (2009: 16) claims, may 'impact on how he or she manages student behaviour ... and the discipline structures implemented in the classroom'. Christian teachers 'believing in a dichotomy between the eternal consequences of heaven and hell', White adds, 'were more likely to adopt authoritarian, teacher-directed methods of behaviour modification'. In the case of all teachers studied, it appears that students' 'mistakes were directly' and consistently 'connected to repentance' (p. 15).

Such studies illustrate that religion matters, that it does in fact play an important role in teachers' instructional decisions and should, thus, be further and more meaningfully explored in teacher preparation. One could argue that the above are isolated examples and that most teachers do not have strong religious beliefs that could influence instruction, but research shows otherwise. A survey conducted with public school teachers in Wisconsin determined that 88% of them profess to believe in God (Hartwick 2009: 15). These figures are corroborated by a 1994 national Gallup Poll in which 84% of teachers indicated a belief in God (Gallup and Lindsay 1994: 24. cf. Hartwick 2009: 16).

Hartwick (2009: 16) goes on to suggest that

Not only do the vast majority of teachers believe in God, but many public school teachers appear to directly connect their belief in God and His will to their professional lives. It appears that for many, teaching is a way they fulfill a sense of divinely inspired mission for their life. For instance, a solid majority (59.4%) of teachers in the sample believed that they have been called by God (felt a deep knowing and sense of mission) to teach. Even more telling, roughly a quarter (24.1%) of teachers in the sample strongly agreed with [that] statement.

Evidence exists (in Schweber 2006; Hartwick 2009; White 2009) that such beliefs impact how teachers conceive of and implement curriculum and instruction and what materials they use—Hartwick's study, for example, notes that teachers who do not believe in God, 'are nearly twice as likely not to use textbooks as teachers who report belief in more traditional notions of God' (p. 38).

While the above studies illustrate that religion does matter at the level of the individual teacher's practise, it is important to emphasize that an exploration of the role of religion in education cannot stop at the door of

the individual teacher's classroom. As much of the literature pertaining to race, gender, and class has demonstrated, and as this paper has attempted to highlight with regard to religion, a critical analysis of the role and impact of categories of difference in education cannot escape an examination of how those play at the institutional level of schooling—through the policies enacted, through the discourses employed, through the daily routines and rituals used, and through the implicit curricula underlying all of the above. For, as mentioned earlier, many of the lessons students (and teachers) take away from school are drawn not from the school's explicit curriculum but from its implicit curriculum and from its organizational, institutional, and discursive curricula. For teacher education to seriously explore how and when any of the categories of difference influence education and its culture and are influenced by it, such categories much be addressed at both the level of the individual teacher and at the level of the institution as a whole. To ignore the value of such an investigation—in the case of this paper, with regard to religion—we suggest, is to do a great disservice to both our teacher candidates and their future students, while undermining the possibility of a fruitful conversation of how religion might best be employed and investigated in an educational world still run-through with both overt and underlying religious influences.

Notes

1. In a US Gallup poll from December 2008, 80% of respondents identified themselves as Christian, while 93% acknowledged celebrating Christmas. A survey of studies by Reuters and Harris/Times put American (self-reported) Christianity between 73–82%. Contrast this with European rates where only Italians claimed explicit religiosity at a rate above 50%.
2. For an exception, see Pinar *et al.* (1995).
3. All definitions are drawn from the *Oxford English Dictionary*.
4. Beyond the immediate linguistic relation of mission to Christianity, there are, of course, the historical reminders of what was done to Native Americans in the name of (and by the hands of) the multiple missions dotting the land in order to convert the unbelievers. That this ubiquitous term, rather than, say 'goals' has been laundered of its religious and historical meanings might give some cause for pause, if not concern.
5. A troubled concept to which Chemin (1994)—along with many others—has applied a feminist critique in her work, *Reinventing Eve*.
6. Gordon and Rendsburg (1997) suggest that the phrase 'Tov Vera', good and evil, pairs opposites to create the meaning of all or everything, as in the English phrase, 'they came, great and small', meaning just that they all came. So the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil they take to mean the Tree of All Knowledge.
7. Critiques of this manner of morally-tinged argument abound. Most prominently, Archard (1993:19) reminds that 'previous society did not fail to think of children as different from adults; it merely thought about the difference in different ways'. This is a ready caution against historical anachronism (or browbeating) to which we willingly defer, agreeing with the idea that 'we can say of previous societies only that they have treated their children in ways of which *we* disapprove' (p. 20).
8. The important issue for Christianity, according to Foucault (1978/1999), and we would argue to current manifestations of schooling as well, is the notion 'that one does not obey to reach a certain result; one does not obey, for example, to acquire a habit, an aptitude, or even an honour. In Christianity [and in school], the absolute honour is precisely to be obedient. Obedience must lead to a state of obedience. To remain obedient is the fundamental condition for all other virtues' (p. 124).

9. Standard IV: Diversity and Equity: Developmental Guidelines.

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